feishu-user-plugin
Productivity · tested 2026-08-21 · re-test due 2026-11-21 · by the Hlido desk, not the vendor
In short: A remarkably deep Feishu/Lark MCP server (85 tools, three auth layers) whose headline trick — sending messages as the actual user, not a bot — is also its biggest risk.
4 PASS · 0 FAIL of 4 public-surface claims
Quick answer
feishu-user-plugin scores 71/100 (STEADY) on Hlido’s independent, hands-on test (reviewed 2026-08-21). STEADY (71) for an unusually deep, well-documented Feishu/Lark MCP server (85 tools, three auth layers, real-time events, MIT) that clearly reflects real use, with a genuinely differentiated user-identity send capability Pricing: Open source (free entry point documented).
feishu-user-plugin is one of the most feature-complete Feishu/Lark MCP servers on the public surface: 85 tools across IM, docs, Bitable (multi-dimensional tables), wiki, drive, calendar, tasks v2, OKR and a real-time-events websocket, with nine slash-command MCP prompts, MIT-licensed and Node 18+. Its differentiator is explicit and technically interesting: because Feishu's official open API has no send_as_user permission (bot tokens always mark messages sender_type: 'app'), this plugin uses a cookie + protobuf path to send text/images/files/rich-post as the user themselves. Three independent auth layers (LARK_COOKIE for user-identity sends, official app ID/secret for the 70+ bot-API tools, and user OAuth UAT for P2P reads) is a thoughtful design, and details like read_doc_markdown ('saves ~60% token'), 10-minute chat-ID caching, and cross-profile retry on specific error codes show a maintainer who has actually used it. The catch is the same as the headline feature: the user-identity path depends on a copied browser cookie and an unofficial protobuf route, which is inherently fragile (cookies expire, protocols change) and lives in a grey area versus Feishu's official API and terms. For a developer inside the Feishu/Lark ecosystem this is a powerful, agent-native tool; the cookie-based user-impersonation layer should be adopted with eyes open.
Why STEADY
STEADY (71) for an unusually deep, well-documented Feishu/Lark MCP server (85 tools, three auth layers, real-time events, MIT) that clearly reflects real use, with a genuinely differentiated user-identity send capability. Not higher because its defining feature relies on a copied cookie + an unofficial protobuf path that is fragile and sits in a terms-of-service grey zone, and because breadth this large can't be verified for reliability from the surface. Not FADING because the tool inventory, auth design and honest engineering detail are substantial and specific.
Public-surface checklist
- PASS Homepage loads (required)
- PASS Primary value prop (required) — A remarkably deep Feishu/Lark MCP server (85 tools, three auth layers) whose hea
- PASS Cta present
- PASS Evidence or demo — 4 screenshot(s) captured
What we saw
4 screenshots captured by the Hlido engine during the reviewed run (run-2d6f30cd173e0f56-ethanqc-github-io). Our own captures — not vendor marketing material.
What it does well
- 85 tools spanning IM, docs, Bitable, wiki, drive, calendar, tasks v2, OKR and real-time events — very broad Feishu/Lark coverage
- Genuinely differentiated: send as the actual user (text/image/file/rich-post/@) where the official API only allows bot-tagged messages
- Three independent auth layers (cookie user-identity, official bot API, user OAuth UAT) that can be configured independently
- Thoughtful engineering details: read_doc_markdown token savings, 10-min chat-ID caching, cross-profile retry on specific error codes, multi-account profiles
- Nine MCP slash-command prompts (/send, /reply, /digest, /doc, /table, /wiki, /drive, /status), MIT-licensed, Node 18+
What it fails at
- The headline user-identity path depends on a copied browser cookie (LARK_COOKIE) — fragile (cookies expire) and awkward to obtain safely
- Uses an unofficial cookie+protobuf route that sits in a grey area versus Feishu's official API and terms of service
- 85 tools is a large surface whose reliability and edge-case behaviour can't be verified from the docs page
- Niche by design — only useful inside the Feishu/Lark ecosystem
Red flags
- The signature 'send as user' capability relies on a copied HttpOnly cookie and an unofficial protobuf path that Feishu's official API deliberately does not expose — expect breakage on cookie expiry or protocol changes, and weigh the terms-of-service risk before production use.
- Handling a raw LARK_COOKIE is a credential-hygiene hazard; treat it like a full session token.
Best for
- Developers and teams inside the Feishu/Lark ecosystem who want deep, agent-driven automation via MCP
- Use cases that specifically need messages to appear from the real user rather than a bot
- Power users who want docs/Bitable/wiki/calendar/tasks/OKR all reachable from one MCP server
Not recommended for
- Organisations that require strictly official-API, terms-compliant integrations (avoid the cookie/protobuf user-send path)
- Anyone outside the Feishu/Lark ecosystem
- Deployments that can't tolerate periodic re-auth when the copied cookie expires
Pricing & access
- ModelOpen source
- Free entry pointYes — a free tier or open-source edition is documented
Derived from Hlido-held evidence only (engine checklist + editorial text); quotes are verbatim from the scorecard; not vendor-supplied; re-derived daily. Verify current prices on the vendor's pricing page. Last verified 2026-08-21.
Related agents
Agent relevance
API CLI MCP Webhook Behavioral-testable
Agentic-Commerce Readiness 76/100 · COMMERCE-READY
Independent readiness for agent delegation & transaction. How it’s scored · check live
MCP server with 85 tools and nine slash-command prompts across Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code and Claude Desktop; real-time events over websocket. npx setup/oauth flow. Directly testable given Feishu credentials, though the user-identity path depends on a copied cookie.
Agent-friendly score: 8/10
Score over time
The longitudinal record — every point is the score as published on that date. Raw series.
Evidence
- Feishu/Lark MCP server for Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code, Claude Desktop; 85 tools, 3 auth layers, MIT, Node >=18 — source (2026-08-21) verified
- Sends messages as the user via cookie+protobuf because the official API has no send_as_user (bot tokens force sender_type: 'app') — source (2026-08-21) verified
- Three auth layers: LARK_COOKIE (user identity, 8 tools), app ID/secret (70+ bot-API tools), user OAuth UAT (2 explicit + UAT-first) — source (2026-08-21) verified
- Nine MCP slash-command prompts (/send /reply /digest /search /doc /table /wiki /drive /status) — source (2026-08-21) verified
- read_doc_markdown returns markdown saving ~60% token; 10-min chat-ID caching; cross-profile retry on specific error codes — source (2026-08-21) verified


